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Abstract
Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical ﬁrms have under-
lined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework
which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concern-
ing regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary
clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as
well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence
eﬀect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the ﬁrms’ gains from trials.
Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry
is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualiﬁed support for additional compul-
sory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies’
decisions whether to conduct trials.
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  1I n t r o d u c t i o n
May 20, 2005, saw the ﬁrst ever international clinical trials day, underlining the importance
of clinical trials to medical research.1 Since they provide the most reliable way to test the
eﬃcacy and safety of medical treatments, randomized controlled clinical trials constitute one
of the main tools of scientiﬁc medicine. Without trials, ineﬀective treatments or, even worse,
harmful interventions may be accepted in medical practice. Accordingly, the appropriate design
of the incentives to conduct clinical research is considered to be of enormous importance as the
following quote from the medical literature shows: “[if] investigators are dissuaded from doing
experimental human research, the plain fact is that patients will die unnecessarily thanks to a
diminution in the rate at which our clinical knowledge advances” (Horton (2006), p. 1633).
Recently, however, there have been a number of highly publicized cases in which pharmaceu-
tical ﬁrms have selectively disclosed evidence on marketed drugs (see e.g. Curfman et al. (2005),
Harris and Koli (2005), Avorn (2006), Harris (2007), or Berenson (2007)).2 These scandals have
generated a controversial debate about the appropriate design of a vigorous research enterprise
that brings innovations to patients as quickly as possible. The consent that the parties asso-
ciated in clinical trials—patients, doctors, researchers, medical journal editors, pharmaceutical
industry, funders and government—have reached is that greater transparency in clinical trials is
needed.3 To achieve this transparency there are mainly two policy proposals discussed: clinical
trial registries and clinical trial results databases.4
A clinical trial registry contains information on ongoing clinical studies. As a result of the
growing support for registries, several voluntary registries have been created by, for example,
public health authorities, the pharmaceutical industry or medical journal editors.5 However,
1Since 2005 the international clinical trials day has been celebrated yearly on or near the 20th of May. The
event is promoted by the European Clinical Research Infrastructures Network.
2The problem of selective publication of clinical trial results has already been recognized long ago and almost
twenty years ago the ﬁrst voices were raised demanding to require registration of all clinical trials prior to initiation
(Simes (1986)).
3The medical literature discusses a second source of selective reporting. This is the so-called publication bias.
It refers to the fact that for peer-reviewed journals negative and inconclusive trials are much less interesting than
positive trials. Consequently, they are less likely to be published (See e.g. De Angelis et al. (2004)).
4Another measure discussed to solve the problem of selective reporting are reporting requirements about a
sponsor’s role in clinical studies. Starting point is the so-called problem of conﬂict of interest. As a result of
an increase in the costs of clinical trials the pharmaceutical industry has increased its inﬂuence on the design,
conduct and result reporting of clinical trials (for example through so-called contract research organizations). If
the ﬁrm’s inﬂuence is very strong, then “the results of the ﬁnished trial may be buried rather than published
if they are unfavorable to the sponsor’s product” (Davidoﬀ (2001), p. 825). See e.g. Krimsky (1999) and the
references in Davidoﬀ (2001) for evidence about the existence of this problem. The present paper makes the
benchmark assumption that the ﬁrm’s inﬂuence about result reporting is complete.







  given the limited success of these voluntary registries in solving the problem of selective reporting
of clinical trials, policy proposals promote now the idea of a compulsory registry of all clinical
trials. Recently, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors promoted a compulsory
registry by requiring registration of clinical trials as a condition of their subsequent consideration
for publication.6 This eﬀort is complemented by the deﬁnition of a minimum trial registration
d a t a s e tb yt h eW o r l dH e a l t hO r g a n i z a t i o na i m e dat standardizing the way information is made
available to the public (see e.g. Gulmezoglu et al. (2005)). There are attempts to create
additional incentives for registering by, for example, urging institutional review boards (of e.g.
universities or hospitals) to consider registration of clinical trials a condition for approval. Also,
around the world, governments are beginning to legislate mandatory disclosure of all trials.
Thus, there is a tendency to create a de facto compulsory registry of clinical trials.
A clinical trial results database contains (a summary of) the results of completed clinical
studies, regardless of outcome. As a result of the scandals caused through selective publication
of trial results even the pharmaceutical industry acknowledges that there is a problem and (at
least a part of) the pharmaceutical industry is supporting the creation of results databases.7
Databases are often proposed in combination with a compulsory trial registry. For example,
on September 27, 2007, President Bush signed into law The Food and Drug Administration
Revitalization Act, which contains mandatory registration and results reporting requirements
(Drazen (2007)).8
This paper aims at contributing to the debate about the appropriate design of the incentives
6The disclosure refers to public registration of summary protocols at the initiation of all trials whose primary
purpose is to aﬀect clinical practice (phase III trials), see De Angelis et al. (2004 and 2005).
7The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), the International Fed-
eration of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA), the Japanese Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturers Association (JPMA) and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
released on January 6, 2005, a “Joint Position on the Disclosure of Clinical Trial Information via Clini-
cal Trial Registries and Databases” (available at http://129.35.73.130/wps/PA_1_0_J0/FINAL%20Position
%20Clinical%20Trials%20Information%20January%2005.pdf, accessed on January 4, 2008). In this document
the industry commits to register ongoing trials (other than exploratory) and to disclose results, regardless
of outcome. In a similar vein is the statement of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (available at
http://www.bio.org/bioethics/background/20050621.asp, accessed on January 4, 2008). In addition, for example,
GlaxoSmithKline has created a results database and commits to disclose trial summaries “whether or not the
data may be judged as positive or negative for its products” (Rockhold and Krall (2006)).
8The signing into law of this act does not imply that the discussion about the design of regulation is settled.
On the one hand, in the U.S. the act must be followed by rule making and the environment in which clinical trials
take place is mainly shaped by other legislation. The U.S. Congress, for instance, is currently considering The
Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act which is an amendment to the Public Health Service Act. On the other hand,
in other parts of the world similar rules are discussed. For instance, several European countries have established







  to conduct medical research by providing a formal analysis of clinical trial registries and research
databases. In a nutshell, our analysis starts from the fact that clinical trials constitute an
investment in information by pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Registries and databases aﬀect the return
on this investment by restricting the way in which drug companies transmit knowledge to medical
decision-makers. They are, therefore, likely to aﬀect the ﬁrm’s investment in information, that
is, the decision whether or not to conduct clinical trials.
>From a strategic point of view—once a clinical trial has been carried out—the scope of
pharmaceutical ﬁrms is limited. Firms can hold back information about unfavorable trials
but they cannot lie and forge evidence in their favor. Holding back trial results considered
‘negative’ is the so-called problem of selective disclosure of trial results which has generated the
debate about reform.9 We propose, therefore, a game of hard evidence (Milgrom (1981)) as the
appropriate model of clinical trials and information transmission from pharmaceutical ﬁrms to
the public.
Inspired by the recent political economy literature on strategic information transmission by
interest groups (see Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) or Dahm and Porteiro (2007)), we propose
a two stage game in which ﬁrms choose in the ﬁrst stage whether or not to conduct clinical
trials. The publication of clinical trial results aﬀects product market competition in the second
stage. We model the second stage through a very mild monotonicity assumption saying that
it is advantageous for pharmaceutical ﬁrms to publish clinical trial results showing that their
products are more eﬀective or have fewer side-eﬀects than thought (this assumption is not only
natural, but also in line with the existing evidence in, for instance, the antiulcer-drug market;
see Azoulay (2002)).
Our model predicts that in the benchmark without disclosure requirements (we call this
the laissez-faire scenario) ﬁrms conform to the behavior that triggered the before mentioned
scandals and report their trial results selectively. We analyze then successively the main policy
proposals discussed. We study ﬁrst voluntary registries and ﬁnd that they oﬀer no advantage
to pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Hence, our approach predicts that these registries will not be used
and explains why voluntary registries could not solve the problem of selective reporting of trial
results. We turn then to the eﬀects of a compulsory registry of clinical trials. We show that a
compulsory registry has a deterrence eﬀect that reduces the incentives of pharmaceutical ﬁrms
to conduct trials and cannot solve the problem of selective reporting. When a compulsory
9Despite the diﬃculty in quantifying the impact of selective reporting due to the lack of data from unpublished
trials, the existing evidence suggests that it is, indeed, a relevant problem. Turner et al. (2008), have analyzed this
issue for the market of antidepressants by comparing evidence obtained from reviews of the FDA about registered
trials, with published reports. They ﬁnd a substantial bias in publication: while 36 out of 37 trials viewed as








  registry is complemented through a clinical trials results database we show that a regime of ‘full
transparency’, in which the decision-maker knowsa b o u tt h ee x i s t e n c eo fa l lt r i a l sa sw e l la st h e i r
results, can be implemented. A key result of our paper, however, concerns the potential adverse
eﬀects of ‘full transparency’ in clinical trials. We show that an important trade-oﬀ emerges.
As ‘full transparency’ reduces the ﬁrm’s gains from clinical trials, fewer trials are conducted.
Obtaining more precise information about the trials conducted comes at the expense of deterring
some trials.
The policy implications of the present paper depend crucially on the degree of sophistication
of medical decision-makers or, more precisely, on their capacity to draw accurate inferences
about the pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ incentives to perform clinical trials. If decision-makers possess
the information necessary to devise a fully sophisticated skeptical strategy, then the best policy
is, unambiguously, that of promoting the use of voluntary results databases, without the need of
a registry. This policy alternative allows the decision-makers to extract all the information that
the ﬁrms acquire through the trials and, at the same time, increases the pharmaceutical ﬁrms’
incentives to undertake clinical trials compared with the laissez-faire scenario. As in Milgrom and
Roberts (1986) a skeptical strategy is a powerful information acquisition tool: (i) In combination
with a database it solves the problem of selective reporting because decision-makers think that,
if a drug company does not post results in a database, this is because it conducted a negative
trial. The ﬁrm in turn wants to avoid this impression and uses the database to prove that a trial
was inconclusive or positive. (ii) Moreover, incentives to conduct trials are stimulated because
a company expected to conduct trials that fails to post results in databases is believed to have
conducted a negative trial. Since this is the worst impression the ﬁrm can give, not conducting a
trial is very expensive. In other words, such a policy reduces the opportunity costs of conducting
trials.
When decision-makers are unsophisticated (because they lack the information required to
draw precise inferences) there is no clear-cut recommendation to be made. The two alternative
policies that are candidates to being optimal are laissez-faire and a compulsory registry com-
plemented through a database. Which regime is optimal depends on how society values more
trials (in laissez-faire) versus more precise information (with the intervention). We oﬀer a deeper
analysis of this trade-oﬀ and provide some qualiﬁed support for the latter. The reason is that
the information gained relates to drugs society knows less about.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents our model of clinical trials.
Section 3 analyzes the laissez-faire scenario without policy, while Section 4 studies the implica-
tions of registries alone and combined with results databases. Section 5 relaxes the assumptions
concerning the information the decision-maker possesses and her degree of sophistication when







  2 A Model of Clinical Trials
We consider a pharmaceutical ﬁrm that produces a drug for a particular therapeutic market.
Success in product market competition depends on the perceived ‘quality’ q of the company’s
product in the eyes of market participants. This perceived ‘quality’ refers to gross eﬀectiveness
and how this eﬀectiveness is diminished as a result of side-eﬀects, contraindications, interactions
with other treatments, and the like.
Treatment eﬀects of pharmaceutical products are uncertain. Controlled clinical trials provide
the most reliable evidence whether treatments are eﬀective. However, trials before access to the
market leave residual but important uncertainty. This uncertainty is accepted at the time
of distribution and once the drug is in the market it is agreed that potential adverse events
should be monitored through postmarketing clinical trials (Pouvourville (2006)).10 The scandals
mentioned in the Introduction have been caused by selective reporting of postmarketing studies,
which are the fastest-growing area of clinical research today.11 An example for such a study are
trials that compare two diﬀerent approaches to treatment, the so-called non-inferiority trials.
We will use this interpretation as an illustration for our analysis.
Prior to the outcome of product market competition the ﬁrm can conduct a clinical trial in
order to show that its product is not worse than its competitors’. A clinical trial can have three
possible outcomes. First, the trial can show the equivalence of two approaches of treatment. We
will refer to this outcome as a positive trial. Second, the trial can show that the ﬁrm’s product is
inferior, a situation to which we will refer as negative trial. Third, the trial can be inconclusive
(see De Angelis et al. (2004)).
We model clinical trials as follows. There are two states of the world {0,1} and we denote
t h et r u es t a t eo ft h ew o r l db yω. The interpretation is that in state 0, the ﬁrms drug is inferior,
while in state 1 both treatments are equivalent. Initially, the probability that the ﬁrm’s drug is
equivalent is q>0. Thus, the perceived ‘quality’ q measures quality in the sense that it answers
the question how likely it is that the ﬁrm’s product lives up to its expectations.
The ﬁrm can conduct a clinical trial at a cost K>0. The result of the clinical trial is denoted
by t. The clinical trial reveals with probability x ∈ [0,1] t h et r u es t a t eo ft h ew o r l d ,t h a ti s ,
t = ω. With probability 1−x, the trial is inconclusive, that is, t = ∅. The information revealed
10According to a study from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, between 1998 and 2003 the
FDA requested postmarketing commitment studies in 73% of the approvals for new drugs (Tufts CSDD (2004)).
Other incentives to conduct postmarketing studies may come from the widespread adoption of drug formularies.
Pharmaceutical ﬁr m sf a c es t r o n gp r e s s u r et op r o v i d ec l i n i c a la n de conomic data that justify their inclusion in the
formulary (Folland et al. (2004)).
11At an annual growth rate of 23%, industry investment in postmarketing research is expected to top $12 billion







  through a trial is hard evidence. This captures the fact that a pharmaceutical ﬁrm cannot forge
evidence indicating that certain desirable treatment eﬀects exist when they do not. However,
the scandals mentioned in the Introduction indicate that the ﬁrm can selectively report trial
results. We denote the ﬁrm’s report or message by M. If the trial reveals that the ﬁrm’s drug
has serious side-eﬀects and is not equivalent to the competitors’, that is t =0 , then the ﬁrm can
hide this trial. Thus, if t = ω, the pharmaceutical ﬁrm can decide to publish the result of the
test or not, i.e., M ∈ {ω,∅}. If the trial is inconclusive, that is, t = ∅, then the pharmaceutical
ﬁrm can not forge evidence and has to report this fact, that is, M = ∅. Although in reality
there are many diﬀerent medical decision-makers who use clinical trial results, for simplicity we
postulate that there is just one representative medical decision-maker who receives the message.
To make the analysis interesting, unless otherwise stated, we focus on situations in which
the perceived ‘quality’ of the ﬁrm is not maximal (q<1) and trials can be successful (x>0).
The precise timing of this game is as follows:
Stage 1: The ﬁrm decides whether to conduct a clinical trial.
Stage 2: A message M is sent to the medical decision-maker (if no trial has been conducted,
M = ∅).
Stage 3: The medical decision-maker updates her belief about the perceived ‘quality’ of the
ﬁrm’s product to qx.
Stage 4: Product market competition takes place.
This game is solved by backward induction. However, instead of solving one speciﬁcm o d e l
for stage 4, we assume, in principle, any model in which the ﬁrm has an incentive to generate
scientiﬁck n o w l e d g e :
Monotonicity Assumption: The equilibrium proﬁts of the ﬁrm resulting from product
market competition, denoted by EΠ(q), are strictly increasing in its perceived ‘quality’ q.
We argue now that this assumption is very mild. First, given that we aim at looking at how
incentives to conduct clinical trials are aﬀected through registries, supposing that proﬁts depend
on trial outcomes is the conservative assumption to make. Starting with a situation in which
there are no incentives to conduct trials would obscure the picture. Second, increasingness of
ﬁrms’ proﬁts on perceived quality is in line with the few existing empirical evidence available
which comes from the antiulcer-drug market (Azoulay (2002)).
Finally, as we will see throughout the paper, an important element for the analysis will be the
extent to which the market rewards a higher perceived ‘quality’. The monotonicity assumption
only requires that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are increasing in the quality, but does not impose any restriction







  pharmaceutical ﬁrm enjoys increasing returns to quality whenever the marginal impact of an
increase in the perceived ‘quality’ is increasing in q (i.e., if the proﬁt function is increasing and
convex in q). Conversely, we will say that the ﬁrm faces decreasing returns to quality if the
marginal eﬀect of an increase in the perceived ‘quality’ is decreasing (i.e., if the proﬁt function
is increasing and concave in q).
3 The Benchmark Scenario: Laissez-faire
“The pharmaceutical industry has systematically misled physicians and patients by
suppressing information on their drugs...”
Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) at a hearing (Couzin (2004a)).
We study now the benchmark scenario for clinical trials, in which ﬁrms are completely
unconstrained in their decision whether to conduct trials. We show that this leads to selective
reporting.
Under laissez-faire, the medical decision-maker does not observe the pharmaceutical ﬁrm’s
decision whether to invest in clinical tests or not. As a result, she has to base her behavior
on her beliefs about what the ﬁrm is doing. The appropriate equilibrium concept is, hence, a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in which both the decision-maker and the pharmaceutical
ﬁrm behave optimally, given their beliefs about the other’s action and these beliefs are, at
equilibrium, correct. As usually, there might be multiple equilibria and we search ﬁrst for a
PBE in which clinical trials are conducted.
Notice ﬁrst that, given that clinical trial results are hard evidence, if the ﬁrm reports low
quality (t =0 ), then the decision-maker infers qx =0 . Because of the monotonicity assumption,
this message strategy is not a best reply. Consequently, the pharmaceutical ﬁrm only discloses






1 if t =1
∅ if t ∈ {0,∅}
. (1)





Pr(w =1 |M =1 )=1 if M =1
Pr(w =1 |M =0 )=0 if M =0




1−xq <q if M = ∅
. (2)
That is to say, if the decision-maker receives no evidence, taking into account selective reporting,







  the pharmaceutical ﬁrm may have received this information and decided not to disclose it (a
negative trial was conducted).
Given this, the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm from investing in a clinical trial are







With probability xq there will be a positive trial and the beliefs of the decision maker will be
qx =1 . However, in the remaining cases the trial will be negative or inconclusive and the
perceived ‘quality’ diminishes to qx = q(1 − x)/(1 − xq).P r o ﬁts when the ﬁrm does not invest








T h er e a s o ni st h a tt h eﬁrm is expected to invest and lack of positive trial results deteriorates
the ﬁrm’s position in the market. The pharmaceutical ﬁr mi n v e s t si nt h et r i a li fa n do n l yi f
EΠt − EΠNo_t > 0 ⇔ K<KLF
t ≡ xq
µ







Provided the above inequality holds, this corresponds to a PBE. We summarize this in the
following result:
Proposition 1 Under laissez-faire, there exists a PBE in which the pharmaceutical ﬁrm per-
forms a clinical trial provided trials are cheap enough, that is, K ≤ KLF
t .
So we have seen that in a world without regulation, there will be clinical trials. We will now
check when there exists a PBE in which the ﬁrm is correctly expected not to perform trials.
If a trial is conducted, reporting is selectively as before, formalized in (1). However, if the






1 if M =1
0 if M =0
q if M = ∅
. (5)
That is to say, if no evidence is received, she will consider that no trial has been conducted and
she will not update her beliefs. Expected proﬁts from a trial are
EΠt = xqEΠ(qx =1 )+( 1− xq)EΠ(qx = q) − K, (6)
and those from not performing the trial become
EΠNo_t = EΠ(qx = q). (7)
The pharmaceutical ﬁrm will not invest in the trial if and only if
EΠt − EΠNo_t < 0 ⇔ K>KLF







  Proposition 2 Under laissez-faire, there exists a PBE in which the pharmaceutical ﬁrm does
not perform a clinical trial provided trials are expensive enough, that is, K ≥ KLF
No_t.
It is straightforward to check that KLF
t ≥ KLF






the two equilibria coexist and the beliefs of the decision-maker determine whether we have
equilibrium with or without clinical trials. It will prove useful to underline at this point that
when there exists no regulation the decision whether or not to invest in trials depends only on
the costs of trials and the degree to which, following the monotonicity assumption, the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts increase in its ‘perceived’ quality. For later reference we summarize this as follows.
Corollary 1 Under laissez-faire, if trials are cheap enough in the unique PBE clinical trials are
performed—independently of the conditions under which product market competition takes place.
The situation described in this subsection has shown how, in the absence of any policy, the
performance of clinical trials is characterized by (i) a lack of observability of the trials that are
actually performed and (ii) selective reporting of the test result by ﬁrms. These are the main
reasons that have led to a demand for regulation. The analysis of the policies proposed is the
subject of our concern in the next section.
4P o l i c i e s
“Honest reporting begins with revealing the existence of all clinical studies, even those
that reﬂect unfavorably on a research sponsor’s product. ... We are far from this ideal
at present ...”
De Angelis et al. (2004, p. 477).
As the previous section has emphasized, in the absence of any policy there is a serious lack
of transparency concerning clinical trials that aﬀects both the observability of the trials that
are performed, and the disclosure of the test results. Consequently, policy proposals have been
formulated in order to achieve “full transparency with respect to performance and reporting of
clinical trials” (De Angelis et al. (2004), p. 477). Before analyzing in detail the implications
of these policies, let us deﬁne, more precisely, what we will consider as “full transparency”
throughout the paper.
Deﬁnition 1 A policy implements a regime of full transparency if the decision-maker can ob-
serve which trials are conducted and knows all the results obtained through the trials.
In what follows we analyze successively the main policies proposed and focus on the question







  4.1 Voluntary Registries of Clinical Trials
“...the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), a Wash-
ington D.C.—based trade group, says it would prefer for Congress to wait and “see if
the voluntary eﬀorts are going to work,” says spokesperson Jeﬀ Trewitt.”
Couzin (2005).
In order to improve transparency in clinical trials voluntary clinical trial registries have
been created. A clinical trial registry contains information about ongoing clinical studies. As a
result, a trial’s existence is part of the public record and this knowledge can be used for medical
decision making. Can voluntary clinical trials registries improve the situation with respect to
the laissez-faire?
First, notice that, although voluntary clinical trials registries exist, there is always the pos-
sibility that the ﬁrm makes no use of the voluntary registry and that the decision-maker does
not take it into account for her belief formation. This implies that the two equilibria presented
in Propositions 1 and 2 still exist.
Second, can there be a PBE in which the decision-maker correctly expects the ﬁrm to conduct
only trials that have previously been registered in a voluntary registry? Suppose the decision-
maker expects the ﬁrm to conduct only trials that have previously been registered in a voluntary
registry. If a trial is conducted, reporting is selectively as before, formalized in (1). If the ﬁrm
registers but does not provide evidence from positive trials, the decision-maker infers that a trial
has been conducted and updates beliefs as in (2). Expected payoﬀs are given by (3). However,
assume the ﬁrm avoids registering although a trial is conducted. In case that it does not provide
evidence from positive trials, the decision-maker infers that no trial has been conducted and
updates beliefs as in (5). Hence, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are given by (6). Thus, the ﬁrm has no
incentive to register the trial.
Proposition 3 Voluntary clinical trial registries have no eﬀect. In particular, there does not
exist a PBE in which the ﬁrm conducts only trials that have previously been registered.
The fact that voluntary registries could not solve the problem of selective reporting has been
the starting point for the demand for more interven t i o ni nc l i n i c a lt r i a l s( s e eD eA n g e l i se ta l .
(2004)). We analyze now compulsory registries.
4.2 Compulsory Registries of Clinical Trials
“One solution, some in Congress say, is a mandatory registry, in which all clinical







  Couzin (2004b).
With a compulsory registry in place the pharmaceutical ﬁrm cannot publish (disclose) evi-
dence from a trial not registered in advance. The whole point of a registry is that, if the ﬁrm
decides to invest in a trial, this decision becomes observable for the public. As a result, the be-
havior of the decision-maker is no longer based on her beliefs about what the ﬁrm is doing. The
ﬁrm selectively reports as in (1), the decision-maker updates beliefs as in (2) when she observes
investment in trials in the registry, and expected proﬁts from conducting a trial become those
in (3). However, if no investment in a trial is made by the ﬁr m ,t h i si sr e ﬂected in the registry.
Thus, the decision-maker does not update beliefs and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts from not investing in the
trial are given by (7). The pharmaceutical ﬁr mi n v e s t si nt h et r i a li fa n do n l yi ft h ef o r m e ri s
larger than the latter which is the same as






− EΠ(qx = q) (8)
⇔ K<KCR ≡ xq [EΠ(qx =1 )− EΠ(qx = q)]−(1−xq)
∙







Summarizing, we have that the following holds.
Proposition 4 In the unique PBE with a compulsory clinical trial registry, the pharmaceutical
ﬁrm conducts a clinical trial if trials are cheap enough, that is, K ≤ KCR; and decides not to
generate scientiﬁc knowledge otherwise.
This result says that when trials are cheap enough, a compulsory clinical trial registry can
solve part of the problem: medical decisions are taken based on all trials conducted. However,
the problem of selective reporting is still there. In addition, incentives for investment in trials are
reduced. This is so because KCR < KLF
No_t holds implying that both (i) the range of situations
in which the ﬁrm conducts trials is more restrictive and (ii) the range of situations in which the
ﬁrm does not conduct trials is larger than under laissez-faire. In this sense it is ‘less likely’ that
the ﬁrm generates scientiﬁck n o w l e d g e .
The intuition for this deterrence eﬀect is as follows. In the decision whether or not to
conduct trials the ﬁrm compares proﬁts of both possibilities. An important consequence of the
compulsory registry is to make the ﬁrm’s investment decision observable for the public. However,
in a PBE with investment in trials, the ﬁrm is already expected to conduct trials. Moreover,
the proﬁts from not investing in trials increase as the registry increases the opportunity costs of
conducting trials. The ﬁrm can now ‘prove’ that it is not conducting trials. Therefore, the lack
of positive evidence is not penalized by the product market and not investing is more proﬁtable.







 It is important to see that this deterrence eﬀect can be substantial. Can there be situations
in which clinical trials are completely deterred? Rewriting we obtain






>E Π(qx = q).
Notice that this only holds if EΠ(q) exhibits increasing returns to quality. Otherwise, no trial is
conducted (even if trials were costless).12 The intuition for this complete deterrence eﬀect is that
the ﬁrm can now win when the trial is positive or lose when it is negative. As a result, investment
in trials only happens when the ﬁrm is willing to take the risk of losing, which depends on the
extent to which the conditions of product market competition reward higher quality.13 Thus,
contrary to the situation without regulation (Corollary 1), with a compulsory registry product
market conditions matter for the ﬁrm’s investment decision in clinical trials.
Corollary 2 A compulsory registry has the following eﬀects:
(i) It always has a deterrence eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s incentives to conduct clinical trials.
(ii) A necessary condition for the ﬁrm to be willing to conduct clinical trials is that there are
increasing returns to quality in product market competition.
The existing evidence on market performance seems to support the assumption of increasing
returns to quality and, hence, the conclusion that the deterrence eﬀect of registries will not be
complete. In fact, Grabowski et al. (2002) estimated a highly skewed distribution of returns (net
present values) for new drug introductions. According to their ﬁndings, the top decile of most
successful new drugs accounted for a 52% of the total present value generated by all new drugs.14
This seems to suggest that market rewards higher perceived quality at a highly increasing rate.
4.3 A Compulsory Registry Complemented by Trial Results Databases
“Democrats plan to introduce legislation ... require that all clinical studies be de-
scribed publicly at their inception and that results be added when a trial is complete”
Couzin (2004a).
12Clinical trial costs are substantial. One single trial may cost from $1 million to more than $50 million (Simes
(2002)). Average costs have been increasing (DiMasi et al. (2003)) and postmarketing trials are very likely to
expensive because the diﬀerences between approved drugs are likely to be smaller than between a drug and a
placebo (Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2006)).
13This parallels the ﬁndings in Dahm and Porteiro (2007) in a model of informational lobbying.
14Moreover, this seems to be a steady pattern of behavior over time since a similar analysis conducted for the
1980-1990 period (Grabowski and Vernon (1994)) also found a highly skewed distribution of returns. In this study,







 In addition to clinical trial registries a second popular policy proposal concerns clinical trial
results databases. Such a database contains (a summary of the) results of completed clinical
studies, regardless of outcome. An important question is to identify which strategic eﬀects the
presence of databases can generate and whether the negative incentive eﬀects of registries extend
to the situation in which registries are complemented through databases.
Notice that if the database is suﬃciently comprehensive, it introduces a mechanism that
solves the problem of selective reporting so that once a clinical trial is conducted, the pharma-
ceutical ﬁrm, if it posts results in the database, has no choice but to reveal the result of the





w if t = w
∅ if t = ∅
. (9)
Note also that assuming that the ﬁrm has no choice but to use the database is equivalent to
imposing a regime of ‘full transparency’ by assumption. So we prefer to make the conservative
assumption that the use of the database is a voluntary choice of the ﬁrm. Moreover, we assume
that the ﬁrm does not have the capacity to credibly commit, ex-ante, that it will disclose its
results to the database. In other words, this means that the decision to post information in the
database is an ex-post choice of the ﬁrm, once it has observed the results of the clinical trial.
On the one hand, since there is a compulsory registry, the decision to conduct the trial is
observable for the medical decision-maker who, therefore, does not have to base her behaviour
on beliefs. On the other hand, the pharmaceutical ﬁrm has to decide, ﬁrst, whether to conduct
the trial or not and, if it conducts it, whether to disclose the results to the database or not. Let
us start by solving this latter decision.
As the database is assumed to be suﬃciently comprehensive, it is a mechanism that, if
used, eliminates any ‘ambiguity’ in the report of the ﬁrm: If the ﬁrm ﬁlls in the database, this
automatically implies that the outcome of the test is made public. What will the ﬁrm do? First
if t =1 , the strategy to publicly disclose the results in the database is trivially optimal: t =1is
the preferred state of the ﬁrm and, hence, making it public can never harm its position. Second,
if t =0the ﬁrm will not report the results to the database: No matter what the beliefs of the
decision-maker are, there is nothing worse than reporting that the trial proved the inferiority
of the ﬁrm’s drug. Finally, if t = ∅,b yﬁlling in the database, the ﬁrm can show that its trial
truly failed and generated an inconclusive result. If the ﬁrm did not post its results in the
database, the decision-maker might suspect that the ﬁrm is hiding a negative result and update
her beliefs in detriment of the ﬁrm’s interest. Hence, if t = ∅, the ﬁrm will report its results to
the database.
The next step is to determine the beliefs of the decision-maker. If she observes that a trial







  the decision-maker can do is to be fully skeptical: “Ie x p e c tt h eﬁrm to ﬁll in the database if
and only if t 6=0 ”. This way the decision-maker can extract all the information even from the
uninformative results.15 This implies the following.
Corollary 3 A compulsory registry complemented by a voluntary clinical trial results database
can implement a regime of ‘full transparency’.
This combined policy, therefore, is successful in achieving full transparency. First, the com-
pulsory registry makes the decision to undertake a test observable to the medical decision-maker
and, secondly, the skepticism of the decision-maker towards the use of the database allows him
to extract all the information from the test, irrespective of its outcome.
What is left to assess is how this enhanced transparency aﬀects the incentives of the ﬁrm to
actually invest in clinical trials. The proﬁts of the ﬁrm from conducting a trial are given by
EΠt = xqEΠ(qx =1 )+x(1 − q)EΠ(qx =0 )+( 1− x)EΠ(qx = q) − K, (10)
while, because of the registry, when no trial is conducted proﬁts are given by (7). Comparing
yields that the former exceeds the latter if and only if
K ≤ KFT ≡ xq [EΠ(qx =1 )− EΠ(qx = q)] + x(1 − q)[EΠ(qx =0 )− EΠ(qx = q)].
Proposition 5 In the unique PBE with a compulsory registry complemented by a voluntary
clinical trial results database the pharmaceutical ﬁrm performs a clinical trial provided trials are
cheap enough, that is, K ≤ KFT; and decides not to generate scientiﬁc knowledge otherwise.
We have shown that ‘full transparency’ can be achieved through this combined policy. How-
ever, an important question is whether this increases or decreases the incentives to conduct clin-
ical trials relative to the laissez-faire scenario. It is straightforward to check that KFT < KLF
No_t.
This implies that—as in the situation of a compulsory registry without database—under ‘full trans-
parency’ both (i) the range of situations in which the ﬁrm conducts trials is more restrictive
and (ii) the range of situations in which the ﬁrm does not conduct trials is larger than under
laissez-faire. Again, it is ‘less likely’ that the ﬁrm generates scientiﬁck n o w l e d g e .M o r e o v e r ,i t
can also be the case that tests are fully deterred. This will not happen, provided
KFT > 0 ⇐⇒ qEΠ(qx =1 )+( 1− q)EΠ(qx =0 )>E Π(qx = q).
15The behaviour of the decision-maker can be considered one of “sophisticated skepticism” as denoted by
Milgrom and Roberts (1986). These authors showed that, in a hard evidence set-up, the best the decision-maker
can do is to interpret any ambiguity in the information disclosed by the interested parties in the way that is more
damaging for the party who disclosed the information. In the present paper the behaviour of the decision-maker







  Notice that this only holds if EΠ(q) exhibits increasing returns to quality. Otherwise, no trial
is conducted (even if trials were costless).16 Summarizing, we have the following.
Corollary 4 A compulsory registry complemented by a voluntary clinical trial results database
has the following eﬀects:
(i) It can implement a regime of ‘full transparency’.
(ii) It always has a deterrence eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s incentives to conduct clinical trials.
(iii) A necessary condition for the ﬁrm to be willing to conduct clinical trials is that there are
increasing returns to quality in product market competition.
This subsection has highlighted an implication of a regime of ‘full transparency’ that the
discussion on policies to regulate clinical trials has neglected so far: There exists a trade-oﬀ
between transparency and incentives to conduct clinical trials. ‘Full transparency’ reduces what
the ﬁrm can gain by conducting trials and consequently fewer trials are conducted. Notice that
this does not imply that ‘full transparency’ is undesirable. The optimal solution to the trade-oﬀ
depends on how policy-makers value transparency versus incentives to conduct clinical trials.
We will analyze a related trade-oﬀ in more detail in Section 5.
4.4 Voluntary Results Databases Complemented by Skepticism
“...at least in some situations, skepticism on the part of the decisionmaker ... can
result in the emergence of all the relevant information and the selection of the optimal
decision...”
Milgrom and Roberts (1986, p. 30).
The last subsection has shown that the objective of achieving ‘full transparency’ can be
achieved through a combined policy of compulsory registries and voluntary results databases
but that this objective necessarily comes at the price of reducing the incentives of the ﬁrms to
invest in clinical trials. We analyze now the question whether one can design a regulatory regime
capable of improving over this regime. We will answer this question in the positive by proposing
a regulation consisting of a voluntary results database alone, that is, without the introduction
of a registry.
16The deterrence eﬀect of the combined policy is, therefore, similar to that of a compulsory registry alone.




CR are strictly positive. That is, whenever the
deterrence eﬀect is not complete, it is stronger under a compulsory clinical trial registry than under the policy







 Suppose this policy is implemented. On the one hand, since there is no registry, the decision
to conduct the trial is not observable for the medical decision-maker who, therefore, has to base
her behavior on beliefs. On the other hand, the pharmaceutical ﬁrm has to decide, ﬁrst, whether
to conduct the trial or not and, if it conducts it, whether to disclose the results to the database
or not. Concerning this latter decision the same reasoning as in the last subsection applies and
the ﬁrm reports the results to the database when t ∈ {∅,1} and hides evidence for t =0 .
The next step is to determine the beliefs of the decision-maker. If she expects the ﬁrm to
conduct the trial, which are the optimal beliefs about the use of the database? Again, the best
the decision-maker can do is to be fully skeptical: “Ie x p e c tt h eﬁrm to conduct a trial and
to ﬁll in the database if and only if t 6=0 ”. This way the decision-maker can extract all the
information even from the uninformative results.
Given these beliefs by the medical decision-maker, the proﬁts of the ﬁrm from conducting a
trial are given by (10), while when not conducting the trial proﬁts are:
EΠNo_t = EΠ(qx =0 ). (11)
Not conducting the trial is very expensive, as the decision-maker will be convinced that the ﬁrm
not only conducted a trial, but also obtained a negative result. Comparing these expressions we
have that the pharmaceutical ﬁrm will invest in the trial if and only if EΠt − EΠNo_t > 0
⇔ K<KVD
t ≡ xqEΠ(qx =1 )+( 1− x)EΠ(qx = q) − (1 − x(1 − q))EΠ(qx =0 ).
Given the monotonicity assumption, it is direct that KVD
t > 0. Finally, it is straightforward that
this system of beliefs and actions forms a PBE. We have, thus, the following result.
Proposition 6 When there is a voluntary clinical trial results database without registry and
trials are cheap enough, that is, K<KVD
t , there exists a PBE in which:
(i) The ﬁrm conducts trials and reports the results to the database, except when the trial
provides evidence against the ﬁrm’s drug.
(ii) The medical decision-maker expects the ﬁrm to conduct the trial and considers the non-
disclosure of results to the database as a proof that the outcome of the trial was negative
for the ﬁrm.
W es e eh o wt h ep r e s e n c eo fav o l u n t a r yr e s u l t sdatabase has very important implications
for the informative equilibrium. The ﬁrm uses the database to give credibility to its message
that the trial failed and reached inconclusive results. Far from being an advantage for the
ﬁrm, this triggers a skeptical response from the decision-maker that turns out to be a very







  the capacity to give full credibility to its messages, can safely infer that, if the ﬁrm has not used
this mechanism, it must be because it has a message it does not want to reveal: the outcome
of the trial was conclusive and against the ﬁrm’s interests. This way the decision-maker can,
at equilibrium, obtain all the information from the ﬁrm and eliminate the problem of selective
reporting.
We have shown how the presence of a database substantially improves the decision-maker’s
capacity to extract information from the ﬁrm’s clinical trials. But is that achieved at the expense
of deterring the ﬁrm from investing in clinical trials? Not at all. If we compare the threshold of
the costs that determines the existence of an informative equilibrium in the laissez-faire scenario
(KLF
t )w i t hKVD
t , it is direct to check that KVD
t > KLF
t . The voluntary results database enlarges
the set of parameters compatible with an equilibrium in which the ﬁrm invests in clinical trials.
In this setting the skepticism on the part of the decision-maker decreases the opportunity cost
of conducting trials, since the absence of any disclosure by the ﬁrm is understood as an evidence
that it is withholding unwanted information. As a result, the ﬁrm is more eager to conduct a
trial. We summarize this as follows.
Corollary 5 The creation of a voluntary clinical trial results database can
(i) stimulate the pharmaceutical ﬁrm’s incentives to conduct clinical trials; and
(ii) solve the problem of selective reporting.
Notice that this policy is optimal in the sense that given ‘full transparency’, trials are stimu-
lated as much as possible: ‘Full transparency’ ﬁxes unambiguously the gains from a trial, while
the opportunity costs of a trial (given by (11)) are reduced as much as possible.
Of course, as usual in these settings, there exists also a non-informative equilibrium in which
the decision-maker optimally expects the ﬁrm not to perform a trial (and, hence, not to ﬁll in
the database). It is straightforward to check that this equilibrium is fully analogous to the one




Proposition 7 When there is a voluntary clinical trial results database and no registry, there
exists a PBE in which the pharmaceutical ﬁrm does not perform a clinical trial provided trials
are expensive enough, that is, K ≥ KLF
No_t.
5 Medical Decisions Based Only on Published Clinical Trials
“...conclusions of therapeutic eﬀectiveness based on a review of only the published







  Simes (1997, p. 134).
The analysis of Section 4 predicts that the decision-maker anticipates the ﬁrm’s investment
decision in trials and bases her decision both on published and unpublished studies (e.g. Propo-
sition 1). However, the discussion concerning regulation suggests that unpublished studies are
not appropriately taken into account. From a formal point of view, the analysis has made
strong assumptions concerning the information the decision-maker possesses and her degree of
sophistication when drawing inference from it. Notice that in order to form ‘correct beliefs’
the decision-maker needs to know for each pharmaceutical product the perceived ‘quality’ q,
how the ﬁrm’s proﬁts depend on this perceived ‘quality’ EΠ(q) and the ‘quality’ x of the trial.
Only in that case, she will be able to form the correct expectations about the incentives of the
ﬁrms to actually conduct trials. We investigate now the implications of situations in which the
decision-maker is ill-informed or simply not sophisticated enough to draw the correct inference.
We model the decision-maker, hence, as a “naive” player in the game that, a priori, does not
expect a trial to be conducted. However, if hard evidence concerning the perceived ‘quality’ q
of the ﬁrm’s product is revealed, the decision-maker’s beliefs are updated accordingly (i.e., as in
(5)). Moreover, if the decision-maker is certain that a trial has been conducted, she is rational,
in the sense that she can update her beliefs as in (2). We oﬀer next an informal discussion
of what implications this has for our analysis. We indicate the corresponding thresholds by ˆ K
instead of K as in the previous sections.
First, under laissez-faire, given selective reporting (1), the decision-maker retains the prior
belief unless a positive trial is revealed. Thus, (6) is compared to (7). This implies that in
(the now unique) equilibrium trials are conducted if and only if trials are cheap enough, that is,
K ≤ ˆ KLF ≡ KLF
No_t.
Second, the conclusions concerning registries are robust: Since once a trial is registered the
decision-maker is able to draw the appropriate inference, voluntary registries will not be used.
Under compulsory registries, trials are conducted if and only if trials are cheap enough, that is,
K ≤ ˆ KCR ≡ KCR. Moreover, when compulsory registries are complemented through a database
the performance of tests can be observed and, hence, the decision-maker is able to have a skeptical
posture. Thus, a regime of ‘full transparency’ can be implemented for K ≤ ˆ KFT ≡ KFT and
the conclusion that ‘full transparency’ has a deterrence eﬀect on clinical trials is still true.
Third, without a compulsory registry the decision-maker is unable to sustain a posture of
sophisticated skepticism. As a result, a voluntary results database without a compulsory registry
does not allow to extract the relevant information. If no trial is conducted, (by assumption) the
decision-maker is not capable of forming expectations that a trial was conducted and the ﬁrm’s







  payoﬀs from conducting a trial are given by (6). Consequently, the laissez-faire equilibrium is
not aﬀected by the creation of a voluntary results database.
Summarizing, relaxing the assumption of a sophisticated decision-maker basically eliminates
the so far unambiguously best regulatory recommendation: a voluntary results database without
a registry no longer solves the problem of selective reporting and no longer stimulates investment
in clinical trials. A simple trade-oﬀ, therefore, emerges. Under laissez-faire the decision-maker
only learns about positive trials. When a compulsory registry is complemented through a data-
base the problem of selective reporting is solved but fewer trials are conducted. The optimal
solution to this trade-oﬀ depends on how society values these diﬀerent alternatives.
W ef o r m a l i z en o wt h i sb a s i ct r a d e - o ﬀ. Proposition 8 shows that in the absence of any
intervention, the incentives of the ﬁrms to conduct trials are higher but, with the combined
policy the decision-makers obtain more information from the trials that are actually performed.
We oﬀer then an analysis of the type of trials involved in the trade-oﬀ which lends some qualiﬁed
support for the popular demand for intervention.
In order to formalize the trade-oﬀ, notice that under laissez-faire, trials are conducted if and
only if K<ˆ KLF. In this case, the information acquired by the decision-makers is: (i) If the test
is conducted and t =1 , then qx =1(i.e., if the test reveals the favorable state for the ﬁrm, the
decision-makers will learn it); (ii) in any other situation qx = q (no information is acquired).
In the scenario in which a compulsory registry is complemented through a voluntary database,
clinical trials are carried out if and only if K ≤ ˆ KFT.17 Here the information acquired by the
decision-makers is: (i) If the test is conducted and t =1 , then qx =1(again, if the test reveals
the favorable state for the ﬁrm, the decision-makers will learn it); (ii) if the test is conducted
and t =0 , then qx =0(i.e., the decision-makers also learn when the test revealed that the true
state is unfavorable to the ﬁrm); (iii) both if the test is conducted and t = ∅, and if the test is
not carried out, then qx = q (no information is acquired).
In order to compare the two policies, we need to deﬁne the value that information has for
society. Let us deﬁne by SV (qx|ω) the value of assigning a probability qx to state 1, condi-
tional on ω being the true state. The only assumption we impose is that the less uncertainty
the better. In other words SV (qx =1 |ω =1 )and SV (qx =0 |ω =0 )are always higher than
SV (qx = q|ω =1 )and SV (qx = q|ω =0 )respectively. Denoting by ∆ the diﬀerence between
the social value with the combined policy and in laissez-faire, the following trade-oﬀ emerges.
Proposition 8 The most eﬃcient scenario is:
17Throughout this section we consider that there are increasing returns to quality in the product market (i.e.,
that ˆ K
FT > 0), so that the combined policy does not fully deter clinical trials. As we already pointed out in
Subsection 4.2, the existing empirical evidence (Grabowski et al. (2002)) seems to support this assumption as the







  (i) Complementing compulsory registries through results databases, if K ≤ ˆ KFT,f o r m a l l y
∆ =( 1− q)x(SV (qx =0 |ω =0 )− SV (qx = q|ω =0 ) )> 0.
(ii) Laissez-faire, if K ∈
³
ˆ KFT, ˆ KLF
i
,f o r m a l l y
∆ = −qx(SV (qx =1 |ω =1 )− SV (qx = q|ω =1 ) )< 0.
(iii) Both policies (since they are equivalent) if K>ˆ KLF.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition formalizes a basic trade-oﬀ for policy-makers. When the introduction of
registries and databases does not deter ﬁrms from conducting trials (i.e., if K<ˆ KFT), then this
is, undoubtedly the best scenario. No matter how we model the value of information, provided we
assume that the more information, the better, this is the most eﬃcient situation. However, if K ∈
³
ˆ KFT, ˆ KLF
i
, under laissez-faire ﬁrms strategically withhold information and the introduction of
registries and databases cannot improve on this situation. The intervention prevents ﬁrms from
conducting trials and, consequently, reduces the amount of information available in the system.
Finally, if costs are very high, then the two policies are trivially equivalent since under neither
of the two, ﬁrms have incentives to invest in trials.
It is clear that the optimal solution to this trade-oﬀ depends, on one hand, on the distribution
of characteristics of ﬁrms —a ﬁrm is a quadruple (EΠ(q),K,x,q)— and, on the other, on how
society values information. In what follows we shed some light on this trade-oﬀ by analyzing
which trials are aﬀected by the policies. To start, consider a population of ﬁrms that only diﬀers
in one dimension. That is, the relationship between proﬁts from product market competition
and perceived ‘quality’ (measured by EΠ(q)), the ‘quality’ of the trials conducted (measured by
x)a n dt h ec o s to fas i n g l et r i a l( K)a r et h es a m ef o ra l lﬁrms. However, pharmaceutical ﬁrms
diﬀer in the products they want to test. Some ﬁrms, for instance, may consider the possibility
of conducting further trials on a product with a good position in the market (given by a high
perceived ‘quality’ q), while other ﬁrms may be interested in pharmaceuticals with a weaker
position. This heterogeneity can be very naturally embedded in the model by assuming that
ﬁrms diﬀer in the ex-ante perceived ‘quality’ of their drugs (q). The higher is q, the better the
ex-ante position of the drug in the market. Notice that a very low or a very high q, also reﬂects
a lower uncertainty about the drug’s true quality.
Consider a continuum of ﬁrms each of which has to decide whether to invest in a clinical trial
to assess the true quality of its product, or not. Firms diﬀer in the value of q that is distributed
according to a continuous density function F (q) in (0,1).A l l ﬁrms have access to the same







  cost. Finally, in order to make the comparison meaningful, we assume that the combined policy







In this setting it can be shown that:
Corollary 6 There exist a series of thresholds, 0 <q 1 <q 2 <q 3 <q 4 < 1, such that:
(i) Firms with q ∈ (q2,q 3] invest in clinical trials both with compulsory registries complemented
through a voluntary database and laissez-faire.
(ii) Firms with q ∈ [q1,q 2) or q ∈ (q3,q 4] only invest in clinical trials in laissez-faire.
(iii) Firms with q<q 1 or q>q 4 never invest in clinical trials.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the support for regulation and for laissez-faire (LF).
Figure 1 represents this corollary. As Proposition 8, the corollary distinguishes three cases.
The ﬁrst says that ﬁrms with intermediate values of q invest in trials under both policies.
Therefore, as intervention allows to extract more information, laissez-faire is not optimal. This
corresponds to the ﬁrst case in Proposition 8. Analogously, the second and third case in the
corollary and proposition, respectively, correspond to each other. When the ﬁrm’s perceived
‘quality’ is either low or high, clinical trials are only conducted under laissez-faire and conse-
quently this is the optimal policy. Lastly, ﬁrms with very extreme values for q are not conducting
trials whatever the policy. Thus, the corollary sheds light on the trade-oﬀ from a diﬀerent angle:







  ﬁrms with extreme perceived ‘qualities’—for which the uncertainty about the ﬁrm’s true qual-
ity is lower—conduct trials. However, under the combined policy decision-makers obtain more
information from the trials that are actually performed, which are trials of ﬁrms with high
uncertainty about the drug’s true quality.
The optimal resolution of the trade-oﬀ depends, hence, on when society values additional
information most. To see that Corollary 6 provides a strong argument in favor of a policy of com-
pulsory registries combined with voluntary results databases, consider the following benchmark
example.
Example 1 Suppose that EΠ(q)=q2, K/x ≤ 7/32 and F(q) is the uniform distribution.
Assume furthermore that society values information in a very simple and symmetric way:
SV (qx = q|ω =1 ) = −1/2+q
SV (qx = q|ω =0 ) = 1 /2 − q.
We show now that in this example society should implement compulsory registries complemented
through a voluntary database.





xq(1 − q) if K ≤ ˆ KFT
−xq(1 − q) if K ∈
³
ˆ KFT, ˆ KLF
i .
Intuitively, these functional forms can be interpreted as formalizing that society values additional
information the more, the higher uncertainty without this information is (i.e., for intermediate
values of q). For K/x =7 /32, the thresholds for q in Corollary 6 read as q1 =0 .23109,
q2 =0 .32322, q3 =0 .67678 and q4 =0 .86422. This implies that the second case of the corollary
applies at most to an interval for q of length 0.27957,w h i l et h eﬁrst case is relevant at least for
an interval of length 0.35356. Notice that this conclusion is also true for higher values of K/x
or if F(q) puts some more weight on the second interval, as q(1 − q) is strictly concave and the
intervals are still not of equal length for K/x =7 /32.
Although the preceding example does not allow to draw general conclusions, it can serve as
a benchmark in order to show that for laissez-faire to be optimal the situation must be special.
For example, laissez-faire becomes more advantageous when:
• The clinical-trials technology (x,K) is expensive, because then K/x is high and the interval
[q2,q 3] of drugs for which the policy will extract more information becomes small.
• The distribution of perceived ‘quality’ F(q) puts important weights on the tails (for in-
stance, a bimodal distribution), because then the mass of ﬁrms that will be deterred by







 • Society values SV (qx =1 |ω =1 )relatively more than SV (qx =0 |ω =0 ) , because then
the weight of the interval [q2,q 3] in the trade-oﬀ becomes small.
On the other hand, under increasing returns to quality and when the situation is not special
in this sense the present analysis lends important but qualiﬁed support for compulsory registries
complemented through a voluntary database. This policy deters clinical trials of ﬁrms with drugs
the medical decision-maker is less uncertain about (q is either high or low). However, society
values this loss of information less than the gain of additional information about pharmaceuticals
with important uncertainty (i.e., those for which the ex-ante value of q is intermediate).
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The present paper has oﬀered a framework to analyze the incentives of drug companies to gener-
ate scientiﬁc knowledge through clinical trials and to investigate how these incentives are aﬀected
through diﬀerent hotly debated regulatory environments. The fact that our model reproduces
the problem of selective reporting and explains why voluntary registries failed to have the desired
eﬀects lends credibility to our analysis. We have shown that currently discussed reform propos-
als of implementing a compulsory registry system can be expected to have important deterrence
eﬀects on the incentives of pharmaceutical ﬁrms to conduct clinical trials: there are situations in
which trials are conducted when there is no clinical trial registry and the trial is not performed
when a compulsory registry is implemented. The policy implications of our model depend on
whether medical decision-makers are well informed and/or sophisticated enough. If they are,
then a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry can both achieve
full reporting of the results of the trials and avoid the deterrence eﬀect. It even stimulates tri-
als. If not, our model provides some qualiﬁed support for compulsory registries complemented
through results databases.
Our analysis has assumed the best case for a clinical trial results database: there is some
mechanism that solves the problem of selective reporting so that the ﬁrm, if it decides to post
results in the database, must report informatively. However, since the information submitted to
databases is limited, it might not be suﬃcient in order to check whether a given trial reported
to be inconclusive is negative or inconclusive.18 When informative reporting cannot be imple-
mented, then databases are just another ‘channel’ through which ﬁrms can report selectively.19
18Results posting in databases conﬂicts with publication in peer reviewed journals. The International Committee
of Medical Journal Editors will consider for publication results previously published if the posting contains less
than 500 words (Laine et al. (2007)).
19In this respect it is crucial how compliance is assured. Proposals include voluntary compliance, monetary







  In this case the results on registries are not aﬀected by the creation of results databases. This
implies that policy-makers have two policies that are candidates to be optimal: on one hand,
the laissez-faire scenario and, on the other, a compulsory registry. With well informed and/or
sophisticated enough medical decision-makers the laissez-faire scenario is unambiguously better,
as more trials are conducted and the same information is revealed. When decision-makers are
unsophisticated the following trade-oﬀ emerges between both alternatives. Under laissez-faire,
there are more trials conducted but with a compulsory registry decision-makers know about the
existence of trials and that some information might be hold back. However, in this scenario the
case for intervention is weaker than with reliable databases, as more trials are deterred and from
those trials that are conducted less is learned.
Although our model is designed to capture a pharmaceutical ﬁrm’s investment in clinical
trials, it seems to capture (at least) some recent developments in the biotech industry, too.
Recently, the United States National Human Genome Research Institute has found that genes
do not act independently but that there appear to be network eﬀects. As a result, the safety of
biotech products has been questioned. According to experts, many biotech companies already
conduct detailed genetic studies of their products but do not report their ﬁndings to regulators.
Consequently, reporting requirements are discussed (see Caruso (2007)).
Our analysis has also implications for a recent proposal to redesign the way clinical trials
are conducted. Lewis et al. (2007) propose public funding and public oversight of clinical
trials in order to do justice to the public good character of trials and assure that results are
fully disclosed (see also Avorn (2006)). Given that their proposal breaks the link between
drug companies and researchers conducting the trials, in the language of the present paper ‘full
transparency’ would be implemented. We have shown that this can be expected to profoundly
change the incentives to conduct trials. As in Lewis et al.’s proposal, “drug companies should
continue to bear a signiﬁcant portion of clinical trial costs” (p. 3), the deterrence eﬀect identiﬁed
in Subsection 4.3 applies and underlines the importance of the condition under which product
market competition takes place for investment in clinical trials. We identify, thus, a force going
in the opposite direction of their prediction that the shift from a privately-supplied public good
to a publicly-supplied one will correct the underprovision of clinical trials.
There are further important issues related to clinical trial registries which cannot be analyzed
within the framework of the simple model of the present paper. One such issue concerns the
quality of the clinical trial (denoted by x). The present paper treats this as exogenous, although
it seems reasonable that the ﬁrm determines (within certain limits) the probability that the trial
is inconclusive. From the perspective of the ﬁrm there will be an optimal level depending among
other things on the institutional framework. Thus, it is likely that registries and databases aﬀect







  are conclusive. We leave this interesting question for further research.
A second issue is related to disclosure timing. There is an important concern that the
creation of a trial registry has the potential to jeopardize the commercial competitive advantage
of pharmaceutical ﬁrms. As a result, the permission to delay disclosure of sensitive information
has been discussed. However, it is not clear whether disclosure threatens or promotes innovation
(see Palmisano (2005)). It is, hence, a challenging future research question to oﬀer guidelines
on this topic.
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  AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proof of Proposition 8
In order to compare the two policies, we compute the expected social welfare SV e under each.
Under laissez-faire we have that:
• If K ≤ ˆ KLF :
SV e
LF =
Pr(w =1 )[ P r( t =1 |ω =1 )SV (qx =1 |ω =1 )+( 1− Pr(t =1 |ω =1 ) )SV (qx = q|ω =1 ) ]
+P r( w =0 )SV (qx = q|ω =0 ).
• If K>ˆ KLF :
SV e
LF =P r( w =1 )SV (qx = q|ω =1 )+P r( w =0 )SV (qx = q|ω =0 ).
Analogously, for the scenario with registries and databases we have that:
• If K ≤ ˆ KFT :
SV e
FT =
Pr(w =1 )[ P r( t =1 |ω =1 )SV (qx =1 |ω =1 )+( 1− Pr(t =1 |ω =1 ) )SV (qx = q|ω =1 ) ]
+Pr(w =0 )[ P r( t =0 |ω =0 )SV (qx =0 |ω =0 )+( 1− Pr(t =0 |ω =0 ) )SV (qx = q|ω =0 ) ].
• If K>ˆ KFT :
SV e
FT =P r( w =1 )SV (qx = q|ω =1 )+P r( w =0 )SV (qx = q|ω =0 ).
Deﬁning ∆ ≡ SV e
FT − SV e
LF and simpliﬁcation of the resulting expressions yields the state-
ment.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 6
It is straightforward to see that ˆ KFT < ˆ KLF. Moreover, it can be checked that:
lim
q→0
ˆ KLF =l i m
q→0
ˆ KFT =l i m
q→1
ˆ KLF =l i m
q→1





>K ,this necessarily implies that EΠ(·) is a convex function in qx
since, otherwise, ˆ KFT < 0. This can be used to check that, both ˆ KFT and ˆ KLF are concave
functions in q.
All these facts together imply that there exist a quadruple (q1,q 2,q 3,q 4) with 0 <q 1 <q 2 <







 • ∀q<q 1 it holds that K>ˆ KLF ≥ ˆ KFT. Trials are never undertaken.
• ∀q ∈ [q1,q 2) it holds that ˆ KLF >K>ˆ KFT. Trials are only undertaken in laissez-faire.
• ∀q ∈ (q2,q 3] it holds that ˆ KLF > ˆ KFT >K .Trials are always carried out.
• ∀q ∈ (q3,q 4] it holds that ˆ KLF >K>ˆ KFT. Trials are only undertaken in laissez-faire.
• ∀q>q 4 it holds that K>ˆ KLF ≥ ˆ KFT. Trials are never undertaken.
This completes the proof.
31